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Introduction
The human sphere rises by pushing back its own animal premise. Being human means the acquired 
inability to remain an animal. In metaphysical terms, this yields the thesis that we are on the island of the 
idea, whose infinite nature pushes the finitude of empirical environments to the background. This would 
make the infinite an enclave within finite circumstances. It would gape open like an abyss directed 
upwards, as an interruption of life required to bear a vision of that which is more than life. Whoever can 
understand that may do so. However one puts it: the space islands of humans are forward-deployed posts 
against the open. (Sloterdijk 2016:460)
For, perhaps, the entirety of its history, humanity has established itself over and against the rest of 
existence, mainly against other animals, certainly against the plant life, microbes and inanimate 
matter that make up the rest of existence on this planet. Humankind’s ability to dominate over 
nature has in fact characterised its definition of itself. In this ‘interruption of life’ brought about in 
order to secure humanity its place amongst the infinite, as Sloterdijk (2016) has phrased matters 
above, a metaphysics is conceived as that which legitimates, not so much the existence of any 
divine being per se, but of the human being itself. The space of ‘the open’, as Rilke had once 
termed it and as Heidegger later appropriated it in his own analysis of the border between the 
human and the animal, is really a site of negotiation and contestation wherein the human being 
comes to face its own image, and perhaps to see it deconstructed before its very eyes.1
As part of its confrontation with humanity and its history, modern humanist thought gave way in 
the early to mid-20th century to less anthropocentric dimensions of critical inquiry, what some 
1.See, amongst others, the relevant remarks made in both Derrida (2008) and Agamben (2004). In the context of contemporary 
philosophical reconsiderations of human being and its relation to ecology, see Wood (2005) as well as his more recent Re-occupy earth: 
Notes toward an Other beginning (Wood 2019).
Background: Issues of identity, interdependence, relationality and violence are far larger than 
the human species alone, although humanity has often pretended as if it alone were the 
beneficiaries of studying such ideas. 
Aim: Pedagogically, the complexity of existence beyond human being must influence the 
traditional humanities curriculum or risk further isolation and alienation within humanity-
dominant narratives.
Setting: As climate change continues to alter our comprehension of what is truly at stake in the 
survival of life on this planet, however, humankind needs a complete rethinking of its 
relationship with the multiple forms of life that dwell alongside it, as well as the traditional 
division between the humanities and the sciences within academic settings.
Methods: It is with this scenario before us that I turn to the work of Bruno Latour who re-
conceives of humanity’s relationship with nature as an interdisciplinary and boundary-
crossing project, one that has deep pedagogical implications.
Results: I demonstrate how Latour’s collaborative and highly original work ranges across 
disciplines and provides new ways to contemplate research in academia.
Conclusion: Latour’s thought moves beyond polarising anti-humanist language and towards 
a way to limit the sovereign claims of humanity, opening discourse towards other non-human 
participants.
Keywords: Bruno Latour; complexity; modes of existence; interdisciplinary; non-human 
participants.
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considered to be a form of anti-humanism.2 Though such a 
stance certainly contains within it the possibility of repealing 
longstanding definitions of the human being – and so 
likewise risks establishing positions that might be deemed 
inhuman at times – what such positions ultimately reveal to 
us are the limitations of seeing the world through purely 
human eyes and so from an extremely limited and solely 
human perspective. Although such anthropocentric views 
are readily questioned today, the impact that this rethinking 
has upon education and learning has yet to be more 
thoroughly exhausted.
Pedagogically, and in terms that need to ripple through an 
academic context more often bent on either diminishing or 
exalting the humanities, we have not really begun to lessen 
the hold of such an anthropocentric perspective in the 
classroom or in terms of curriculum development, while at the 
same time retaining something of its importance. So many 
fields within the humanities – history, politics, economics, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, languages and 
literatures, not to mention theology – have been almost 
entirely reliant upon the focal point of the human being, a 
remnant of humanity’s long struggle with itself and its own 
understanding. This very limited point of view, however, and 
as voices in the sciences often remind us, is drawing to a close.3
So much anxiety surrounds the possible death of the humanities 
in its contemporary struggle with the relevance (and funding) 
of the sciences. However, perhaps the problem is not the 
potential irrelevance of the humanities, but rather the failure of 
the humanities to open up to life lived beyond the very limited 
perspective of humanity (Felski 2016:215–229).4 The life that 
seemed to be larger than the physical, empirical life surrounding 
it – what Sloterdijk (2016) marked as the entrance of 
metaphysics and its myriad justifications for humanity’s 
dominance over everything else in our world – needs to be 
brought down to the level of simply life itself, of but one of the 
other life forms that occupy the world in which we live.5
Issues of identity, interdependence, relationality and violence, 
amongst so many others, are far larger than the human 
species alone, though humanity has frequently pretended as 
if it alone were the beneficiaries of studying such ideas. As 
the increasingly drastic realities of climate change continue to 
alter our comprehension of what is truly at stake in the 
survival of life on this planet, humankind is, however, 
desperately in need of a complete rethinking of its relationship 
to the multiple forms of life that dwell with it as well as the 
traditional division between the humanities and the sciences 
2 See the historical narrative unfolded in Geroulanos (2010).
3.See the arguments presented in, amongst others, Touya de Marenne (2016).
4.These reflections are, in part, inspired by the issue of New Literary History devoted 
to the question of humanities in the light of the work of Bruno Latour specifically. 
5.The decline of metaphysics in the modern era and the accompanying rise of atheism 
and secularity have provided a focus upon humanity, but one sphere of a much more 
complex and diverse existence that surrounds it at the same time as this realisation 
also opens up an increased stress upon a life lived without metaphysical supports – 
just another life amidst many other lives. See, for example, the argument for atheism 
made in this context in Hägglund (2019). For more political theological responses to 
climate change, see, amongst others, Keller (2018) and Northcott (2013).
within academic and university settings. Regarding 
pedagogy, and as should become clear in what follows, more 
of the complexity of existence beyond the human being must 
be brought to bear upon the traditional humanities 
curriculum or the risk of further isolation and alienation 
might spell a catastrophic end to human civilisation.
It is with this impending and admittedly apocalyptic scenario 
before us that I want to look at the work of Bruno Latour which, 
more recently, re-conceives of humanity’s relationship to nature 
as an interdisciplinary and boundary-crossing project, one that 
has deep pedagogical implications that, I argue, we must learn 
to embrace more fully. This is not to suggest that Latour’s work 
is the first or the most comprehensive account of the need to 
make such movements in academic discourse. His collaborative 
work across various unique disciplines and perspectives – 
from the philosophy of science to the limits of religious 
discourse – however, provides new ways to contemplate 
research in an academic setting, and in a way that fully dovetails 
with ongoing work in ecological, ecofeminist and critical – 
theoretical fields. In what follows, I want to introduce and 
examine some of the implications of his philosophical thought 
as it moves beyond polarising anti-humanist language and 
towards a way to limit the sovereign claims of humanity, 
opening discourse up towards other, non-human participants 
in ways that we have only just begun to consider. It is my hope 
that this introduction to Latour’s work within a pedagogical 
perspective might yield some fruitful points of mutual 
engagement for those already working in similar territory.
Learning to see beyond the limits of 
humanity
According to Latour (2013b):
Nothing prevents readers who have now become coinvestigators 
from proposing to restitute experiences and link values in ways 
that differ completely from my own. (p. 480)
As numerous voices make clear to us nearly every day, 
humanity has long neglected to take seriously the complex 
relationships, environments, biospheres and ecosystems that 
have been functioning on this planet long before humanity, 
only relatively recently, ascended to the top of a self-
constructed pyramid asserting its own dominance. Humanity 
has, and certainly continues, to define itself according to an 
elaborate series of identities, properties, possessions, 
representations and capacities that are, viewed from the 
perspective of those abundant natural phenomena that far 
exceed the population of humanity, quite limited. Yet the 
society and normative order we have created, including all of 
the social, linguistic, legal, juridical, political, religious and 
economic markers that comprise most human affairs, sets an 
exceedingly narrow vision of who has the right to speak 
within such a context, indeed who even has anything like 
legal rights at all.
From the beginning, then, we must recognise how the 
academic classroom is inherently confined and conditioned 
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to limit its participants to those alone who have set boundaries 
in advance for what types of speech will and will not be 
allowed. What is missed, omitted, marginalised or otherwise 
excluded from this conversation is so numerous, however, as 
to almost render the entire enterprise of education superfluous 
before it begins – a point that a good many ‘practical’ learners 
who have found traditional education to be less than to their 
liking have doubtlessly noted for centuries.
It is consequently no surprise that the popular imagination 
permeating our world today is full of those apocalyptic 
images that signal the limitations of human existence, from 
post-apocalyptic zombie scenarios to imagined worlds where 
disease has rendered life nearly impossible, from a planet 
that can no longer reproduce children to another one where 
unleashed natural disasters or monstrous creatures upend all 
normative daily life. These suggestive images go some ways 
towards explaining the success of Weisman’s (2007) The world 
without us, a realistic, scientific look at what would happen to 
our world should humankind suddenly stop existing. This 
disaster scenario – from a human point of view at least – may 
have at one time seemed rather pessimistic or bleak, though 
it has increasingly begun to take up a certain space more 
squarely within a popular consciousness that knows how 
something about human existence as it is currently configured 
is strangely amiss.
Powers’ (2018) Pulitzer Prize-winning novel The overstory 
about the world of trees and nature conflicting with a 
decidedly human–financial agenda points us in much the 
same direction, though it also underscores the fundamental 
problem with trying to rethink humanity’s relationship with 
other, non-human actors who traditionally have no rights 
and so no place within political and economic discussions. 
As one of his characters, a copyright and patent lawyer, 
reflects at one point upon a legal proposal that would grant 
rights to non-human things, such as trees (Powers 2018): 
The proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable. 
This is partly because until the rightless thing receives its rights, 
we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use of ‘us’ – those 
who are holding rights at the time. (p. 250)
As he eventually goes on to consider corporations, 
universities, states and infants all have lawyers who represent 
them, so why cannot other non-human things? 
What is it within us that gives us this need not just to satisfy basic 
biological wants, but to extend our wills over things, to objectify 
them, to make them ours, to manipulate them, to keep them at a 
psychic distance? (Powers 2018:250–251) 
The implicit answer, of course, is that a psychic distance is 
necessary in order to assert dominance over a ‘thing’, or 
whatever is defined as ‘less than human’ and so devoid of the 
rights that are granted only to those things we have chosen to 
bestow with dignity. Humanity’s often extremely limited 
coordinates used to determine the worth of valid and invalid 
representations depend upon utterly precarious constructs 
needing to be critically called into question. This is precisely 
where the philosophy of Latour becomes of critical interest to 
us, as he repeatedly points beyond what lays before our eyes 
in order to see a much more complicated, but also realistic, 
world of varied and multiple modes of existence. 
As an example of such limitations, we might note, for 
example, and as Latour most certainly does, the ways in 
which humanity has become overly reliant upon those facile 
dualisms that structure our world in hegemonic fashion.6 
The restrictions of ancient and modern dualistic categories – 
raw/cooked, sacred/profane, real/constructed, mind/body, 
conservative/liberal, transcendence/immanence, nature/
nurture, freedom/predetermined, heaven/hell, master/
slave, friend/enemy and so onto the limits of all human 
forms of speech – are surpassed by the various modes of 
existence that go far beyond these overly simplistic 
renderings and which interact in various and diverse ways 
(Latour 2013b:146). As Latour (2013b:458) himself describes 
these relationships in his monumental study An inquiry into 
modes of existence, the interactions between these modes – 
some of which include religion, law, politics, fiction, 
technology and morality – make a movement away from a 
monolithic vision of each mode of existence, signalling their 
intertwined existence as well as presenting a lesson in how 
everything must learn to inhabit a multi-verse and not a 
singular universe that dictates a singular logic or a singular 
morality which only comes, for its part, to fear any semblance 
of plurality or relativism.
According to the multifaceted logic that Latour espouses, 
there is no mystery within existence other than the recognition 
that there are multiple other modes and agents involved in 
the construction of any given perspective, expressing in their 
totality a situation that appears to obscure or veil what can be 
known about a thing, but which really issues a call to show 
more compassion and understanding for the complexity of 
existence itself. As Latour (2013) himself describes this almost 
mystical state of material existence: 
This impression that there is always something more than what is 
known in the thing known does not refer at all to the unknowable 
[…] but to the presence of other modes whose equal dignity 
epistemology, despite all its efforts, has never allowed to be 
recognized. (p. 85, emphasis in the original)
If only humanity would look deeper into whatever 
perspective or phenomenon we see, he implores, we might 
be able to comprehend better some of the many factors that 
are at work in making this only apparent singularity what it 
is for us within a given context.
Not being able to sense the complexity of a given ‘object’ 
(which is really always a subject in its own right), we are 
typically left with a mistaken impression of a thing’s identity, 
as if it were able to exist on its own, as something possessable, 
fixed and determined. We thereby fall headlong into a 
category mistake that is so commonly made as to be 
6.I am drawn here to the work of Antonio Gramsci and his analysis of dualistic thought 
in the context of hegemonic political forms. See Anderson (2017).
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misunderstood as the normative measure (Latour 2013a).7 
From Latour’s (2013b:17) point of view, judging one mode of 
existence with the veridiction criteria of another mode – 
something that happens a good deal of the time and which 
only further obscures our detection of those forces working 
necessarily in unison with each other – frequently results in 
numerous tensions that might otherwise be dispelled if they 
were only more properly understood. For example, the 
criteria used in the realm of politics to determine veracity is 
quite often thrust upon religion, or the criteria used in legal 
matters is assumed to be appropriate for moral decisions, 
creating impasses and conflict where none was necessarily 
inherent to a given reality. Though it is certainly the case that 
any particular mode is invested in relationships with other 
modes, the moment they intersect in an embodied agent or 
event, each mode also provides a unique window into the 
operations of whatever is transpiring at a specific moment, 
what Latour calls a process of ‘veridiction’ for that particular 
mode. In his words (Latour 2013b): 
A mode of existence is thus always both a version of being-as-
other (a debiting of discontinuity and continuity, difference and 
repetition, otherness and sameness) and also its own regime of 
veridiction. (p. 183)
Taking the time to understand each mode of existence and its 
various manners of operating can therefore go some way 
towards defusing potentially confusing situations, as well as 
clear a path towards other modes of existence that had 
previously been neglected within a given context.
The possibility of hearing voices that had been marginalised 
or suppressed beforehand is dependent upon our ability to 
open humanity towards understanding how such 
interactions, overlaps and distinctions between modes 
actually work in a given, and always unique, context. And 
though each mode has its own procedures for securing 
veracity, no single mode functions in complete isolation 
from another, giving us a much fuller picture of reality 
than we could ever hope to represent in language. There is 
always a call for witnessing to how more complexity is at 
stake in assessing reality, even if reality itself cannot be 
representationally exhausted.
Listening to the voices of the social 
Seeing better how the various modes of existence function 
together allows us moreover to gain a new perspective 
entirely on the domain of the social. The ‘social’, as humanity 
has traditionally conceived it, is really, according to Latour 
(2013b:280, 296), ‘the concatenation of all the modes’ whose 
unity can no longer be guaranteed by a human institution. It 
is a complex tapestry of alterity and multiplicity that could 
be of great benefit precisely when humanity does not attempt 
to override its plurality and difference through the imposition 
of a sense of continuity offered through arguments involving 
essentialist configurations of substance and nature (Latour 
7.Latour gives us a brilliant insight into such categorical mistakes as those that lie 
between religion and science in his extended essay Rejoicing: Or the torments of 
religious speech.
2013b:279). The domain of the social must be left to its own 
processes and dynamics, he argues, and not brought under 
the veridiction criteria of one mode only, as certain political 
and religious formulations have been tempted over the 
course of history to do. 
It is in this sense that Latour (2018:12–13) acknowledges how 
globalisation should imply a multiplication of viewpoints, not 
their restriction under a particular universal heading. A 
totalitarian state or all-encompassing religious world view is 
not the path towards which the social walks, and though his 
embrace of a pluralistic interaction of modes may sound at 
times like a capitalist, free-market enterprise, this is the 
reality of what lies at the heart of the state of being-as-other 
that ceaselessly involves ‘the mini-transcendence of 
alteration’ (Latour 2013b:254). The goal, as Latour (2013b:203) 
describes it, is one of imploring a maximum of transformations 
and embracing metamorphosis as a process so that 
‘everything can, everything must, become something else.’ It 
is in this sense that Latour’s philosophy extends the 
philosophy of seeing ‘oneself as another’ into new realms 
beyond the self/other division.8
As one might also surmise from these suggestions, resisting 
the desire to provide order ‘too quickly’ to the complex realities 
around us – the very stuff of reductive representations – 
becomes the maxim that drives Latour’s (2013b:401) analysis 
of the various modes of existence and their interactions. It is 
these creative fictions we weave together through the 
interactions of law, politics, religion and the like that are what 
make the domains of politics, religion and law possible in the 
first place (Latour 2013b:249). Trying to disentangle them 
completely from one another in order to make discrete 
categorical distinctions may be helpful for focusing one’s view 
in a very narrow sense (and such efforts should certainly not be 
discouraged), but such efforts are ultimately something that 
must be linked up with other modes in order to recognise the 
sheer complexity of modes and interactions actually at play in 
a given context. This is a task involving interpolations, 
amalgamations, syncretism and harmonics, or, more simply, 
the recognition that such tasks were always already happening 
throughout the many worlds inhabited on this planet 
throughout history (Latour 2013b:304). Though these 
endeavours may never be exhaustively catalogued or fully 
understood, this fact in no way reduces the need to strive for 
such complete comprehension (a task akin to the sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu’s efforts to always ‘objectify objectivity’).
Although his categories are mainly dependent upon 
humanity’s perspective on itself and its world, it becomes 
clear fairly soon in his analysis that what he is ultimately 
aiming for goes far beyond the limitations that humanity has 
placed upon itself. Insanity, Latour (2013b:301) counters, for 
example, is produced only by the myth of autonomy – a 
modern claim advanced by almost every academic discipline 
that asserts its own methods and knowledges to assert its 
8.See how this theme is also developed in the philosophy of Ricoeur (1995), 
specifically in his Oneself as Another.
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sovereign descriptive claims over reality. This point is 
duplicated at another higher level when we simply apply it 
to humanity in relation to the rest of the world as a whole, 
something which Latour certainly endorses in his work. And 
this point is one that we would be well advised to pay 
particular attention to as well, for the way in which 
fragmented academic discourses proceed is by imagining 
that one discipline’s account of reality suffices for an 
exhaustive description of that reality, when it is rather a 
highly limited perspective that, historically at least, fails to 
account for perspectives beyond those asserted by humanity. 
As Latour (2013b:298) himself notes, the problem with 
religion historically was that it, as a single mode of existence, 
feigned to ‘take responsibility for all domains – politics, 
morality, art, the cosmos, law, even the economy.’ Religion’s 
reductive gestures were enough, at least historically at certain 
points in time, to displace other (sovereign) claims and to 
elevate itself as the sole arbiter of knowledge at the same 
time. This problem, however, was not just that of religion but 
that of humanity as a whole as it sought to elevate itself 
above all of the other existences that occupy and dwell within 
this planet. With such thoughts, we are returned to Sloterdijk’s 
(2016) insistence that metaphysics began with humanity’s 
attempts to exceed the forms of life situated all around it.
Such an example of religion’s justifications for dominance, I 
would highlight as well, does little more than beg the 
question of how a single disciplinary domain or field of 
inquiry might attempt to do the same in a contemporary 
setting, providing reductive explanations, for instance, of 
complex and multifaceted phenomena, not to mention how 
the entire educational edifice of the humanities still bears the 
imprint of a reductively oriented humanity in the very way it 
is structured within universities and their discourses. The 
traditional ploys for sovereign power, as embodied in a 
monolithic perspective that attempts to describe all of reality 
from its singular point of view – the ‘objective’, ‘God’s eye’ 
angle – are only furthered through particular disciplinary 
observations and the anthropocentrism of university 
academics on the whole. Embedded within such ‘expert’ 
opinions are formulations of subjectivity indebted to 
uniquely modern claims to sovereignty that have been 
roundly critiqued but which still maintain a hegemonic hold 
over the institutions and identities that govern academic 
discourse. It is from this point of view that Latour’s steadfast 
critiques of the subject/object dichotomy are most needed.
When Latour therefore suggests that just as humanity once 
had to invent the fiction of sovereignty in order to introduce 
a new political paradigm, so too do we have the opportunity 
as well to invent a new way of performing politics beyond 
the old fictions that have carried us this far. Accordingly, we 
are right to extend an analogy from political forms of 
sovereign power into the realm of university discourse and 
academic disciplines in order to challenge the ways in which 
the professorial voice or the voice of the researcher is 
articulated, maintained and defended as a sovereign subject 
currently in need of displacing or at times perhaps replacing 
altogether (Latour 2017:263). Though there is nothing new to 
such revaluations as these insights have characterised 
educational theory for quite some time now, there is still the 
ongoing quest to understand what new forms of education 
might supplant those models of expertise and knowledge-
accumulation that have dominated modern pedagogical 
discourse. There is still to be heard the many other voices that 
surround humanity but which, until now, have not been 
allowed a place at the table where the main conversation 
about the fate of our planet is being had. We might think, for 
example, what a curriculum might be like if academics were 
less inclined to centralise historically metaphysically laden 
disciplines (e.g. the significance of religion, wars, Eurocentric 
male political actors and so forth) and more inclined to study 
ecosystems, migration patterns, human – animal interactions, 
the ‘poetry’ (symmetry) of nature and so on.
Beyond this highly suggestive formulation of things, the true 
pedagogical revolution occurs when Latour contemplates 
new forms of political association that disseminate sovereign 
power into multiple locations, causing it to be no longer the 
sole possession of humanity. It is here that a complete 
rethinking of democracy takes place.9 Latour’s (1993:142–
145) introduction of what he terms a ‘parliament of things’, 
where traditional anthropocentric models of sovereign 
power are challenged and restricted based on the sovereignty 
of other claims, such as those of the animal world, the natural 
environment, air and water and so forth, becomes a prime 
illustration of how disciplinary associations, for example, 
might be reformulated along these very same lines of thought. 
As he describes the limitations imposed upon any one 
particular agent in a recent study of the fate of our planet 
(Latour 2017): 
[I]f one party is capable of taking the territory of another because 
that other is already occupying, invading, or restricting it, then 
that party will be granted equal sovereignty. It will not have to 
act surreptitiously; it will have to introduce itself and state its 
interest, indicate its war aims, specify its friends and its enemies 
– in short, say where it is, what allows it to distance itself from the 
others. In so doing, it will make visible to the others the territory 
that it occupies or that preoccupies it. (pp. 268–269)
Although this suggestion would otherwise conjure thoughts 
of a warm welcome by any particular discipline of 
knowledge within the academy, the practical realities of 
disciplinary knowledges, methods, histories and archives 
rather indicate limitations to such overlap, trespassing and 
efforts aimed at consilience. What passes as a proper 
methodology in one discipline, for example, may appear to 
contradict that of another, leaving an impasse between 
groups and persons that appears as insurmountable. 
The received wisdom of a given tradition becomes 
entrenched and frequently dogmatic, denying even the best 
intentioned interdisciplinary perspectives.
9.His comments are shared in this regard with those of climate scientists and 
politicians who have argued for a wider opening of political forms of representation 
within contemporary democratic contexts. See, amongst others, Purdy (2018), 
where the author argues for expanding democracy to include other non-human 
actors, citing Latour’s work explicitly in favour of such a position.
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What Latour (2017:272) would rather work towards 
articulating, however, is a refocusing of interest and insight 
on the ‘several overlapping authorities’ that exist in reality, 
for no domain is an isolated island unto itself. The 
complexities of existence dictate that this be so. Each 
discipline, if perceived from another angle, is already 
invested in other methods, knowledges, tactics, opinions and 
imprecise, and even concealed, relationships. Learning to see 
more of this complexity and relationship should be the main 
occupation of education, though the preservation of a 
dominant narrative that provided by Homo sapiens has rather 
taken centre stage for far too long. What becomes of education 
in the century to come, on the other hand, depends very 
much on our ability to adapt to this new way of seeing the 
complexity and interdependence of reality.
In very practical terms, Latour recognises that any particular 
focal point – such as say, the sociological, economic, religious 
or biological – cannot expect to master the techniques and 
insights of every other domain, allowing rather for various 
fictional representations to replace more precise accounts until 
a later, more precise reckoning can be made. That’s why Latour 
(2017:273) claims that, in a Parliament of Things, there will be 
a need for the fiction of representation for those things that 
cannot speak for themselves, such as water and air, but this is 
a fiction comparable to the fiction of the sovereign that Hobbes 
had once imagined in his Leviathan. His formulation of the 
concept of Gaia is accordingly that it is not something needed 
to replace the sovereignty of nation states, or to represent the 
Earth as ultimately sovereign over humanity; it is needed in 
order to demand that sovereignty be shared and not held in 
the possession of one particular agent (Latour 2017:280).
Implications
At this point, it should be obvious, but also perhaps 
incredibly daunting, to realise the implications of Latour’s 
suggestions for education today. As many others have 
suggested for some time now within pedagogical research, 
there is certainly the need to allow ‘other’ disciplinary 
methods and knowledges to overlap with and permeate 
each other, causing interdisciplinarity to thrive as the central 
principle of education, perhaps no longer beholden to 
traditional disciplinary boundaries as has been typically 
considered normative, though relying upon the various 
models of veridiction associated with each at the same time. 
Educators must allow new linkages of varied knowledges 
to ripple outwards into other modes of existence, with one 
impacting the other, such as frequently occurs between 
politics and law, for example. 
But such interactions are truly only the tip of the iceberg, as 
such activity also means allowing new ‘non-academic’ 
voices into the academy, even allowing non-human actors 
into the laboratory of the humans as subjects in their own 
right, no longer as non-human ‘things’ denied the rights to 
their own existence. As one of Latour’s commentators, 
Miller (2013:63), has put it: ‘Nature cannot be neatly 
separated from society and the human cannot be neatly 
distinguished from the nonhuman’, a conclusion with 
drastic effects upon learning on the whole. In a time where 
climate change scientists need to have their voices heard 
more clearly than ever, it is imperative that we too learn to 
transgress traditional boundaries and let non-human actors 
be part of academic and political conversations in ways that 
allow us to creatively rethink the very nature of education 
from the ground up.
In particular, and in a way that shares with ecofeminist 
thought (and even ecofeminist theologians), Latour is 
attentive to the ways in which such reconfigurations of our 
most basic educational norms (like the division between the 
sciences and the humanities) can only come about through 
a critique of those modern forms of sovereignty that have 
sustained disciplinary boundaries and territories. His focus 
on the plurality of various modes of existence is a direct 
challenge to monolithic notions of sovereignty and 
autonomy that resonates with ongoing work in political 
theory and political theology. In other words, pedagogical 
reform will only be possible, from Latour’s point of view, 
once we learn to take seriously the historically weddedness 
of humanity to its religious, political, economic and 
philosophical legacies. It is only by addressing the social 
and political complexities of the human being and its 
historical dominance over nature – as manifested in each of 
these various disciplines – that we might begin to 
reformulate educational norms in such a way as to open up 
the disciplines much wider towards other non-human 
participants.
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